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Abstract. According to Twardowski, truth is if it is independent of temporal coordinates. This 
understanding was one of the main arguments against truth-relativism. Kotarbiński rejected 
this view as far the issue concerns sentences about the future, but he did not elaborated this idea 
from a logical point of view. Leśniewski offered an argument that truth is eternal if and only if it is 
sempiternal; Twardowski shared this opinion. Łukasiewicz rejected sempiternality but retained 
eternality. His main novelty consisted in applying three-valued logic to explain how it is possible 
that truth is not sempiternal. Łukasiewicz also pointed out that bivalence together with the 
principle of causality implies radical determinism. Kotarbiński accepted Leśniewski’s criticism 
and he defended Twardowski’s view in Elementy.  Tarski did not explicitly addressed to the 
problem of absoluteness or temporality of truth. On the other hand, Kokoszyńska proposed an 
interpretation of the semantic theory of truth as absolute. It is possible to justify absoluteness of 
truth in semantics cum the principle of bivalence and show that bivalence does not imply 
determinism.   
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The concept of truth was one of the most important philosophical topics 
investigated in the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS for brevity). Most philosophers 
belonging to this group defended the absoluteness of truth.1 I selected Kazimierz 
Twardowski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Stanisław Leśniewski, Jan Łukasiewicz, 
Alfred Tarski and Maria Kokoszyńska as the most significant authors offering 
interesting logical argument for alethic, that is, pertaining to truth, absolutism 
and against truth-theoretic relativism.2 In most cases, I will not review truth-
1 But not all. Edward Poznański and Aleksander Wundheiler were the most notable exceptions. 
They proposed in 1934 a variant of the consensus theory of truth as more accurate for the 
philosophy of science. 
2 One should also menton Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski and Zygmunt Zawirski 
who also belonged to the logical wing of LWS. However, they did not developed  new separate 
argument for alethic absolutism. Władysław Tatarkiewicz or Izydora Dąmbska opted for the 
absoluteness of truth from the point of view of axiological or/and epistemological absolutism. 
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definitions proposed by the mentioned philosophers (a comprehensive account 
of related definitions can be found in WOLEŃSKI, SIMONS [1989].3 In 
general, Twardowski and his most students accepted the classical truth-
definition. Perhaps the following scheme captures the basic intuition: 
(*) A truth-bearer (sentence, proposition, statement, judgment, etc.) is 
true if and only if A says that it is so and so and it is so and so.4
The scheme (*) was in LWS concretized in various ways, for instance, by the 
formula “the sentence of the form ‘a is b’ is true if and only if the object denoted 
by the term a possesses a property expressed by the predicate b. Note that LWS 
generally avoided the label ‘the correspondence theory of truth’ as misleading.   
Twardowski, influenced by Bolzano and Brentano, offered classical arguments 
against relativism (see TWARDOWSKI [1900]). He did not define the concept 
of truth (at least in TWARDOWSKI [1900]) and simply identified truth with 
true proposition. His main problem concerns the question whether truth is 
absolute or relative. According to Twardowski an utterance A is absolutely true 
if and only if A is true at all times, all places and all conditions, but A is 
relatively true if and only if A is true at some times, some place or certain 
conditions. Twardowski mentioned the following examples of relatively true 
utterances: 
(1) It is raining in Lvov today; 
(2) This flower has a pleasant smell; 
(3) Cold baths are healthy; 
(4) It is morally wrong to conceal truth. 
According to standard arguments of alethic relativism, (1) can be false 
tomorrow, even if it is true today and, moreover, can be true in Lvov, but false in 
Cracow, (2) is (or can be) true for some persons and flowers, but false for other 
persons or flowers,  the truth-value of (3) depends on who uses cold baths and, 
finally, (4) is a derivative of moral views. Consequently, sentences, according 
to relativists, can change logical values dependently on times, places or
circumstances. 
Twardowski did not agree with the above account. First of all, he distinguished 
propositions and sentences. The former, but not the latter are proper bearers of 
truth. On the other hand, sentences frequently have not fixed meaning, because 
indexicals, temporal and spatial coordinates, occur in them. An appeal to special 
3 I will also not compare views about the (alethtic) absolutism/relativism controversy advanced in 
LWS with ideas proposed in other philosophical circle.
4 I what follows, I will use the unified terminology, in particular, the nouns “proposition” and 
“sentences” are employed, even if original terminology employed the verb “judgment” or 
“statement”; I sometimes use the nun “utterance” in order to  be terminologically neutral.
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changing circumstances constitutes another reason for having inexact meaning 
by sentences. If we eliminate elements generating having  inexact meanings by 
sentences, we obtain complete sentences expressing fixed propositions. Thus, 
(1) – (4) become: 
(1’) It is raining in Lvov at the time t; 
(2’) This flower smells pleasantly for the person P; 
(3’) Cold bath is healthy for the person P; 
(4’) According to the moral view M, it is morally wrong to conceal truth 
respectively. Converting incomplete sentences into propositions, complete by 
definition, result in possessing definite logical values by the latter. One can 
eventually speak about truth or falsehood of sentences, if it is known which 
propositions are expressed by them. Twardowski offered two other arguments 
against alethic relativism. Firstly, relativism confuses truth of A and the 
knowledge that A is true. Secondly, this view violates the principle of the 
excluded middle and the principle of non-contradiction, which are the 
fundamental laws of logic. However, this principles should be applied not to 
sentences, but to propositions. If A is a proposition, not-A is as well. Now, A and 
not-A cannot be both true and exactly one from this pair is true, but the second is 
false. Twardowski did not mention any representative of relativism in 1900. In 
(TWARDOWSKI [1975]), he exemplifies alethic relativism by the account of 
truth proposed by pragmatism.  
It is convenient to introduce some terminology related to Twardowski’s 
considerations with respect to temporal aspects of having logical values by 
propositions being their their bearers. We say that truth and falsity are 
omnitemporal, that is, if A is true (false), then A is true (false) at every time (and 
reversely, of course). A is sempiternally true (false) if and only if provided that A
is true (false) at time t, it is also true (false) at every time earlier than t.5 Finally, 
A is eternally true if and only if, provided that it is true at time t, it is also true at 
every time later than t. A very interesting question consists in the relation of 
absoluteness of truth to its omnitemporality, sempiternality and eternality. 
In 1913 took place a very hot debate between Kotarbiński and Leśniewski. The 
former (see KOTARBIŃSKI [1913]) defended eternality of truth, but rejected its 
sempiternality. His concerns was the possibility of creative human action. 
According to Kotarbiński, the existence of a such action is inconsistent with 
sempiternality of truth. Consequently, he admits eternal truths  which are not 
5 We can also say that truth (falsity) is predetermined if it is sempiternal (I will omit the reference 
to falsity in  most further remarks). It immediately suggests a connection of properties of truth with 
the perennial problem of determinism and indeterminism. However, this question was not touched 
in Polish discussions about alethic absolutism and relativism. I will omit the reference to falsity in  
most further remarks. 
Jan Woleński98
definitions proposed by the mentioned philosophers (a comprehensive account 
of related definitions can be found in WOLEŃSKI, SIMONS [1989].3 In 
general, Twardowski and his most students accepted the classical truth-
definition. Perhaps the following scheme captures the basic intuition: 
(*) A truth-bearer (sentence, proposition, statement, judgment, etc.) is 
true if and only if A says that it is so and so and it is so and so.4
The scheme (*) was in LWS concretized in various ways, for instance, by the 
formula “the sentence of the form ‘a is b’ is true if and only if the object denoted 
by the term a possesses a property expressed by the predicate b. Note that LWS 
generally avoided the label ‘the correspondence theory of truth’ as misleading.   
Twardowski, influenced by Bolzano and Brentano, offered classical arguments 
against relativism (see TWARDOWSKI [1900]). He did not define the concept 
of truth (at least in TWARDOWSKI [1900]) and simply identified truth with 
true proposition. His main problem concerns the question whether truth is 
absolute or relative. According to Twardowski an utterance A is absolutely true 
if and only if A is true at all times, all places and all conditions, but A is 
relatively true if and only if A is true at some times, some place or certain 
conditions. Twardowski mentioned the following examples of relatively true 
utterances: 
(1) It is raining in Lvov today; 
(2) This flower has a pleasant smell; 
(3) Cold baths are healthy; 
(4) It is morally wrong to conceal truth. 
According to standard arguments of alethic relativism, (1) can be false 
tomorrow, even if it is true today and, moreover, can be true in Lvov, but false in 
Cracow, (2) is (or can be) true for some persons and flowers, but false for other 
persons or flowers,  the truth-value of (3) depends on who uses cold baths and, 
finally, (4) is a derivative of moral views. Consequently, sentences, according 
to relativists, can change logical values dependently on times, places or
circumstances. 
Twardowski did not agree with the above account. First of all, he distinguished 
propositions and sentences. The former, but not the latter are proper bearers of 
truth. On the other hand, sentences frequently have not fixed meaning, because 
indexicals, temporal and spatial coordinates, occur in them. An appeal to special 
3 I will also not compare views about the (alethtic) absolutism/relativism controversy advanced in 
LWS with ideas proposed in other philosophical circle.
4 I what follows, I will use the unified terminology, in particular, the nouns “proposition” and 
“sentences” are employed, even if original terminology employed the verb “judgment” or 
“statement”; I sometimes use the nun “utterance” in order to  be terminologically neutral.
ABSOLUTENESS OF TRUTH AND THE LVOV–WARSAW SCHOOL… 99
changing circumstances constitutes another reason for having inexact meaning 
by sentences. If we eliminate elements generating having  inexact meanings by 
sentences, we obtain complete sentences expressing fixed propositions. Thus, 
(1) – (4) become: 
(1’) It is raining in Lvov at the time t; 
(2’) This flower smells pleasantly for the person P; 
(3’) Cold bath is healthy for the person P; 
(4’) According to the moral view M, it is morally wrong to conceal truth 
respectively. Converting incomplete sentences into propositions, complete by 
definition, result in possessing definite logical values by the latter. One can 
eventually speak about truth or falsehood of sentences, if it is known which 
propositions are expressed by them. Twardowski offered two other arguments 
against alethic relativism. Firstly, relativism confuses truth of A and the 
knowledge that A is true. Secondly, this view violates the principle of the 
excluded middle and the principle of non-contradiction, which are the 
fundamental laws of logic. However, this principles should be applied not to 
sentences, but to propositions. If A is a proposition, not-A is as well. Now, A and 
not-A cannot be both true and exactly one from this pair is true, but the second is 
false. Twardowski did not mention any representative of relativism in 1900. In 
(TWARDOWSKI [1975]), he exemplifies alethic relativism by the account of 
truth proposed by pragmatism.  
It is convenient to introduce some terminology related to Twardowski’s 
considerations with respect to temporal aspects of having logical values by 
propositions being their their bearers. We say that truth and falsity are 
omnitemporal, that is, if A is true (false), then A is true (false) at every time (and 
reversely, of course). A is sempiternally true (false) if and only if provided that A
is true (false) at time t, it is also true (false) at every time earlier than t.5 Finally, 
A is eternally true if and only if, provided that it is true at time t, it is also true at 
every time later than t. A very interesting question consists in the relation of 
absoluteness of truth to its omnitemporality, sempiternality and eternality. 
In 1913 took place a very hot debate between Kotarbiński and Leśniewski. The 
former (see KOTARBIŃSKI [1913]) defended eternality of truth, but rejected its 
sempiternality. His concerns was the possibility of creative human action. 
According to Kotarbiński, the existence of a such action is inconsistent with 
sempiternality of truth. Consequently, he admits eternal truths  which are not 
5 We can also say that truth (falsity) is predetermined if it is sempiternal (I will omit the reference 
to falsity in  most further remarks). It immediately suggests a connection of properties of truth with 
the perennial problem of determinism and indeterminism. However, this question was not touched 
in Polish discussions about alethic absolutism and relativism. I will omit the reference to falsity in  
most further remarks. 
Jan Woleński100
sempiternal. Consider an object O created by a human action in time t. Clearly, 
O does not exist before t. Kotarbiński, following Brentano,  defines truth by the 
following formula: 
(5) A proposition A affirming an object O is true if and only if O exists; 
A is false   
otherwise. 
Now, if O does  not exist, A is neither true nor false. Consequently, A cannot be 
true or false and it is indefinite. By contraposition, A is definite if and only if A is
true or false. Consider the following statements: 
(6) For any A, either A or not-A is true; 
(7) For any A, A is true or false; 
(8) For any A, if A is true, not-A is false, 
as possible forms of the principle of the excluded middle. If we adopt that A is 
true is equivalent with A is not-false, (4) and (5) express the classical excluded 
middle. However, the admission of indefinite sentences is at odds with the 
equivalence of ‘true’ and ‘not false’, Consequently, (6) and (7) have a restricted 
validity, contrary to (8) which is universal. These considerations lead to  
(9) For any A, A is definite or A is indefinite, 
as a generalized (or modified) the principle of the excluded middle. Clearly, 
(9) is fully consistent with qualifying some propositions as neither true not false, 
but just indefinite.6
Leśniewski very strongly criticized Kotarbiński’s account of truth tolerating 
indefinite propositions. He sarcastically remarked (see LEŚNIEWSKI [1913], 
p. 104, page reference to English translation):
No truth can be created! The need to stress and energetically instill this view in 
others is growing now that, at the present stage of development of Polish 
‘philosophy’, voices claiming that truths are created are clamoring even more 
loudly. It is not only the protagonists of all sorts of ‘Pragmatism’, ‘Humanism’ 
‘Conventionalism, ‘Instrumentalism’, ‘previdionism’, etc. that speak of the 
‘creation’ of truths’, i.e. not only the representatives of these ‘philosophical’ 
trends according to whom a judgment ‘becomes’ true: if it is useful for the 
preservation of the species; if it is an effective instrument of thought; if it assists 
in predicting reality, etc. That is not only those for whom, like for the Greek 
sophist Protagoras and the  Polish sophist Florian Znaniecki, ‘man is is the 
6 Kotarbiński iks sometimes regarded as a forerunner of many-valued logic. See WOLEŃSKI 
[1990] for further remarks. Perhaps one remark is in order. Kotarbiński suggest nothing about the 
nature of indefinite propositions. In particular, he does not explains whether the indefiniteness 
should be considered as an additional logical value or a truth-value gap. 
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measure of all things’ and thus a ‘measure of truth’. Slowly, truth begin to 
become ‘created’ even by the representatives of the cam which has gathered at 
the Lvov University around Professor Kazimierz Twardowski; that is the camp, 
whose members have for such a long time believed that a judgment is always 
absolutely truth, i.e. that is true independently of whether it is useful of 
damaging; whether it helps to forecast the future or not; whether a scholar felt 
like ‘creating’ ther given truth and he did, or refrained from such ‘creation’, etc. 
No truth can be created!
Although Kotarbiński is not mentioned in the above quotation, Leśniewski 
alludes to him as a person going against one of the most characteristic doctrines 
of Twardowski’s school.
Leśniewski presented in his essay a very detailed criticism of Kotarbiński’s view 
that some truths are eternal but not sempiternal. According to Leśniewski, 
a sentence (he used the nominalistic language in his works) of the type ‘a is b’ is 
true if and only if the object signified by the term a has a property signified by 
the predicate b. it is just the case that the sentence possesses the function of 
symbolizing. Two conditions must be satisfied for possessing this function. 
Firstly, the term a cannot be empty, and secondly, the predicate b must connote 
a property of the object denoted by the subject term. If these conditions are 
satisfied, if A is true, not-A is false. This suffices for grounding the law of the 
excluded middle for sentences possessing the function of symbolizing; this 
principle is violated by sentences with empty terms, because is a is empty, ‘a is 
b’ as well as its negation are false. Thus, although Leśniewski  does not consider 
the excluded middle as a universally valid principle, he also rejects indefinite 
sentences. Assume that if a sentence A is not false it is also not true. According 
to Leśniewski’s semiotic claims, this sentence fails to possess  a function of 
symbolizing and it simultaneously does not possess such a function. Leśniewski 
argues that these assumptions produce a contradiction. I will not reproduce 
Leśniewski’s proof (by reductio ad absurdum) that a contradiction actually 
follows from premises adopted by Lesniewski (see WOLEŃSKI, SIMONS 
[1989], p. 401–402); this paper shows that Leśniewski argument is incorrect and 
must be supplemented by additional premises), where one can find which 
additional premises are to be add). The most important Leśniewski’s result is 
following one: 
(10) A is eternal if and only if it is sempiternal. 
Due to (10) every truth is omnitemporal. It is important to note that Leśniewski 
used only classical logic. I will return to this problem at the end of the present 
paper.  
Although it was 1913 and no non-classical logic was suggested to copy with the 
problem of sempiternality and eternality of truth, Leśniewski-type arguments 
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can be used by everybody who maintains that classical logical rules are 
sufficient to argue for the absoluteness of truth (see also below). Kotarbiński 
accepted Leśniewski’s criticism and resigned from indefinite propositions and 
the view that truth can be eternal, but not sempiternal. In KOTARBIŃSKI 
[1929] he repeated Twardowski’s arguments against relativism and considered 
truth as an absolute property of sentences (he also became a nominalism). 
Twardowski himself (see TWARDOWSKI [1971]); this paper was written about 
1913)) joined Lesniewski in his criticism of Kotarbiński. Leśniewski did not 
return to the problem of temporality of truth in his later writings. However, he 
proposed (see LEŚNIEWSKI [1931]) certain interpretation of the phrase
(11) ‘a is b’ is true at time t.
Leśniewski proposed to read (11) as
(12) ‘a is b at time t’ is true. 
This allows a simple interpretation of tensed sentences as absolutely true or 
false, because the letter t is a parameter, not functions as a variable. It also seems 
that constant Leśniewski’s opposition against many-valued logic was motivated 
by his strong feeling that truth is omintemporal.  
Łukasiewicz’s standpoint toward alethic absolutism and relativism is connected 
with many-valued logic (ŁUKASIEWICZ [1922], [1930]). His discovery of 
this kind of logic was strongly motivated by the question of determinism 
and indeterminism. Łukasiewicz argued that two-valued (bivalent) logic 
supplemented by the principle of causality implies strong determinism.7
Consider the simplest case, namely three-valued logic. Future contingencies, that 
is sentences about future events exemplify those sentences which are neither true 
nor false in the moment of their issuing. Let A be such a sentence. We have (the 
symbol v(A) means “the value of a sentence A) = v(not-A) = ½). This sentence 
became true or false in the future. Otherwise speaking, sentences with the third 
value, denoted by the fraction ½ become true or false. 
Now the question arises whether Łukasiewiczian semantics implies alethic 
relativism. Clearly, truth is not sempiternal on Łukasiewicz’s views, because if  
A is a future contingency and v(A) = 1 at time t, it can have another logical value 
in moments earlier than t. On the hand, if A becomes true (or false) at time t, it 
remains true (or false) for ever. Consequently, truth is eternal, although not 
sempiternal. According to Łukasiewicz, this consequence is coherent with 
alethic absolutism, because (I use another language than Łukasiewicz’s did) this 
view concerns changing truth of A into falsity but not becoming A true. The 
property of eternality makes truth stable and it suffices for alethic absolutism. 
7 Logical determinism is the view that (strong) determinism follows from the principle of 
bivalence. According to Łukasiewicz logic does not suffice for justify determinism from. 
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Two remarks are in order here. Firstly, we should distinguish strong absolutism 
and weak absolutism. The former considers truth as omnitemporal (sempiternal 
and eternal), but the latter attributes to truth eternality only. Leśniewski was 
a strong absolutist but Łukasiewicz accepted the weak form of alethic 
absolutism. Secondly, we can state a generalized version of the discussed 
problem. Typically, absolutism and relativism are discussed with respect to 
truth. Adding falsity does not create any specific problem. The situation 
changes, when we take into account other logical values, for instance, the third 
value in Łukasiewicz’s semantics. Examples suggest that it is not eternal. On the 
other hand, if we accept that not possibilities will be realized in the future, at 
least some neither-truth-nor-falsehoods can be eternal with respect to to their 
logical values. Similar considerations concern sempiternality of the third value. 
It seems that various ontological circumstances can influence specific semantic 
properties of sentences having other logical values that truth or falsity.  
Tarski did not explicitly address himself to the philosophical problem of alethic 
abslolutism.8 However, he mentioned the (see TARSKI [1933], p. 199; page-
reference to English translation) that the concept of correct (or true) sentence in 
an individual domain, used in the Hilbert school, is of a relative character. 
Hence, he indirectly suggested that the semantic definition of truth as formulated 
in TARSKI [1933] is absolute. However, it only means that the absolutist 
semantic truth-definition is formulated for the entire domain D of individuals. 
Speaking more philosophically, this domain can be identified with the world in 
its integrity.9 Now, if someone selects a sub-domain D’  D, a relativized  
concept of truth is obtained. At least three reasons justify an analysis of the 
semantic concept of truth as related to the alethic absolutism/relativis problem. 
Firstly, Tarski explicitly considered his truth-definition as an answer to an 
epistemological issue. Hence, we can try to address typical epistemological 
problems to the definition in question, even if Tarski was silent about them. 
Secondly, Tarski relativized truth to a language. Thirdly, Tarski implicitly in  
TARSKI [1933] and explicitly in his later works, relativized truth to a model M. 
Summing up the second and third point, Tarski’s analysiss concerned the phrase 
(13) a sentence A of a language L is true in a model M.
And now we encounter the question whether (13) implies that truth is relative. 
It was Kokoszyńska (see KOKOSZYŃSKA [1936a], [1936b], [1948], [1951]) 
who offered an absolute interpretation of the semantic definition of truth. 
8 Jan Tarski, Alfred’s son, told mi once that his (Jan’s) father considered absoluteness as a very 
important property of truth. However, it could be that (Alfred) Tarski was thinking about an ethical 
problem, not epistemological one. 
9 However, it is very likely that Tarski was thinking about mathematical domains and their sub-
domains.
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can be used by everybody who maintains that classical logical rules are 
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According to Kokoszyńska the predicate ‘is true’ is incomplete and can be 
qualified in various ways, for examples, by reference to circumstances C. 
A sentence A is relatively true if and only if there exist circumstances C and C’
such that A is true with reference to C and not-A is true with reference to C’.
This relativism is proper. It can be radical, provided that for every sentence A, A
is true with reference to circumstances C and it negation is true with reference 
tom circumstances C’, or moderate, provided that we have do with truth-
relativity of some sentences only. Moreover, we have improper relativism 
consisting in relativisation to models (possible worlds). More specifically, if A is 
true in one model, let say M and  not-A is true in another model, let say M’, this 
situation leads to improper relativism. Although proper relativism tolerates the 
change of logical values of all or some sentences, dependently of circumstances,  
improper relativism entails the stability of truth and falsity in models.  
Kokoszyńska’s views require some comments and supplements. First of all, she 
précised Twardowski’s criticism of alethic relativism. In fact, she repeated 
Twardowski’s arguments in setting them as using the concept of circumstance as 
a general relativiser. Secondly, Kokoszyńska assumed classical logic. Her 
definition would qualify so-called dialetheias, that is, pairs of sentences of the 
type ‘A and not-A’ which can be true, as true. Paraconsistent logic (more 
precisely, one of its versions) admits dialetheias. Hence, we have a problem how 
paraconsisten logic is related to the absolutism/relativism distinction. If d is 
a dialetheia with A and not-A as its members, both components of d can be true 
in the same circumstances. His means that paraconsistent logic (with dialetheias) 
does not imply even moderate dialethic relativism. I note this problem without 
entering into its more detailed analysis. Thirdly, many-valued logic proper 
moderate relativism, because if v(A) = ½, it becomes true or false dependently of
some circumstances. It suggests that improper relativism considers truth (falsity) 
as omnitemporal and should be qualified as absolutism. 
Kokoszyńska understood sentences as equipped with fixed meanings. 
Consequently, she could resign from the distinction (maintained by 
Twardowski) of sentences as incomplete utterances and thereby not prop[er 
truth-bearings) and propositions as items with complete meaning and being 
proper truth-bearers. This observation indirectly leads to a Twardowski-like 
reading of Tarski. The latter defined the concept of truth via the notion of 
satisfaction. Usually we speak about satisfaction of open formulas (formulas 
with free variables). For example, the formula ‘x is a logician’ is satisfied by 
Tarski, but not by Heidegger. Sentences are formulas without free variables, for 
instance, ‘Tarski is a logician’ or ‘there is such x, that x is not a logician’. 
Tarski’s ingenious observation was that if sentences (closed formulas) are 
a special case of open formulas and sentences are true or false, truth (falsity) 
should be considered as special cases of satisfaction (non-satisfaction). Since we 
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can prove that for any sentence (a closed formula) A is satisfied by all infinite 
sequences for a model M or is satisfied by no such sequence, it is natural to 
define truth of A as its satisfaction by all sentences and its falsity as satisfaction 
by no sequences.10 Now we can interpret sentences in Twardowski’s sense as 
open formulas. In fact, the utterances ‘it is raining today’ and ‘it is raining here’ 
mean ‘it is raining in time x considered as today’ and ‘it is raining in the place x
considered as here’.11 Consequently, we open formulas are relatively true (false) 
depending on circumstances (interpretations of free variables), but sentences are 
absolutely true, because (see note 10) their logical values are conditioned by the 
structure of models (possible worlds, etc.). Now, one could eventually observe 
that models are circumstances.12 Thus, if we intend to interpret the semantic 
definition of truth as absolute, we need to justify that M in the phrase ‘a sentence 
A is true in a model M’ is not a a circumstance in Kokoszyńska’s sense. 
Here is an argument that relativisation of truth to models is consistent with 
absolutism understood as the thesis that truth is omnitemporal (I follow 
WOLEŃSKI [2015]). The argument concerns  future contingencies, that is, 
sentences which can be true or false in the future. I will identify possible worlds 
with models of maximally consistent sets and use the concept of branchability 
(ASSER [1972], 168-169) as defined by (‘iff’ stands for ‘if and only if’): 
(14)(a) a set X of formulas branches at a formula A iff the sets X  {A}
     and X  {A} are  consistent; 
(b) a set X is branchable iff there is a formula A at which X branches;
(c) a set X is branchable iff X  is a consistent and incomplete set of 
sentences. 
Let X be a consistent set of sentences and  A be a sentence independent of X.
Thus, due to the independence of A  with respect to X, this set is incomplete and 
the sets X’ = X  {A} and X’’ = X  {A} are consistent. Consequently, the 
conditions listed in (14) are fulfilled and X branches at A. Note that we do not 
need to assume that the sets X’ and X’’ are maximally consistent.  The diagram 
() provides a scheme of this situation: 
10 A warning. Sequences of objects are not to be understood as facts. The former are a technical 
device used in the semantic truth-definition. The basic intuition behind defining truth via 
satisfaction is that if A is a sentence, its logical value does not depend on valuation of bound 
variables (other not occur in sentences). Philosophically speaking, truth and falsity depends of how 
things are in a model M assuming that sentences having logical values have fixed meanings. 
Tarski’s claim that his definition is applicable only to interpreted languages should be interpreted 
as an assumption that meaning are given in advance.
11 Of course, interpreting indexicals as hidden free variables is nothing new. 
12 SUSZKO [1957] and HAACK [1978] interpret Tarski’s original definition (that is, from 
TARSKI [1933] as absolute, but the predicate ‘is true in M’ as expressing a relative concept of 
truth. 
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X’ = X  {A}
PAST         A
X’’ = X  {A} 
Let A be a sentence uttered at t fixed as present and refers to a contingent future 
event (this means that X is branchable, that is A is independent of X). Assuming 
that X consist of all truths about the past, it is consistent (PAST is its model), 
and X’ and X’’ are consistent as well and they have models W’ and W’’ 
respectively. We change the diagram () into (’)
W’
    PAST      A
W’’ 
PAST can be considered as the initial segment of  both W’ and W’’. Otherwise 
speaking, W’ and W’’ enlarge PAST; intuitively PAST comprises everything 
what happened until the moment t (including this moment itself). Moreover, W’ 
and W’’ are parts of different possible worlds, that is, models of consistent sets. 
They are different, because the world W’ validates A, but the world W’’ verifies 
A. PAST can be identified with the initial segment of the real world WR,
which grows through time. Depending on what will actually happen in the 
future, PAST will enlarge to W’ or W’’ (for simplicity, I neglect further 
possible future cases of branching).  
Truth-conditions for future contingencies can be easily stated by applying the 
standard possible world semantics associated with classical modal logic. In 
particular, sentences about future contingent facts are modals with the possibility 
operator . Suppose that A is such a sentence. It is true in the real world  WR if
and only A is true at least in one possible world accessible from WR (in fact, 
PAST generates the accessibility relation); denote this world by W’.
Consequently, due to the contingency of the fact described by A, the sentence 
A is true in WR if there is a possible world W’’ in which A is true is true. 
The world W’ and W’’ are just (different) worlds sutitable for validating A and 
A in the real world. Assume that A is true in the future. This means that A is 
true in W’. However, since PAST and W’ are segments of WR, A cannot be 
false in PAST. So if A is true, its truth is omnitemporal. Similar reasoning 
concerns the situation in which A is true.13 Now we can return to Leśniewski 
13 This argument also refutes the view that classical logic entails strict determinism.
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claim expressed by (10).Assume that A is true at a moment t. At first, we will 
prove that sempiternality entails eternality. If A is true sempiternally, it is true at 
every t’  t. Since the branching moment is critical, we assume that t is just this 
parameter. Consequently, A is true in W’ or A is true in W’’. Furthermore, A  is 
true in M’ = PAST + W’ or A is true in M’’ = PAST + W’’. This implies that 
A is false in M’ = PAST + W’ or A is false in M’’ = PAST + W’’. Clearly, A
cannot change its logical value in a model belonging to {M’, M’’} without 
producing inconsistency. Thus, if A is sempiternally true, it is eternally true as 
well. To prove the converse implication, suppose that A is eternally true, that is, 
if A is true at t, it is also true at any moment t’  t; of course, A is true in W’ or 
W’’ and a fortiori, in M’ or M’’. Consider a moment t’’  t. Assume that A is 
false at t’’. This means that A  is false in PAST. However, this implies that A
is false in M’ or M’’, contrary to our earlier assumption. Thus, if A is eternally 
true, it is sempiternally true as well. This closed the proof that A is sempiternally 
true if and only if A is eternally true. Thus, truth in a model is omnitemporal and 
the semantic definition of truth defined the absolute concept of truth.14
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